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David B. Dennis
»O Freunde, nicht diese Töne!«
First World War Beethoven Reception as Precedent for the Nazi ›Cult of Art‹
In his book on aesthetics and Nazi politics, translated into English as The Cult of Art in Nazi
Germany, Eric Michaud, Director of Studies at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales
in Paris, wrote that National Socialist attention to the arts was intended »to present the broken
[German] Volk with an image of its ›eternal Geist‹ and to hold up to it a mirror capable of
restoring to it the strength to love itself.«1 Thus did references to the History of Western Humanities – constructed according to fairly longstanding »Germanic« points of view about Kultur – have
a formative function in the Nazi program. Through them, Michaud wrote, the party attempted
to fabricate an »ideal image« of the Volk intended to constitute the »model and guide capable
of propelling it toward its own salvation.«2 Cultural history, then – perceived in these politicized
terms as a propaganda tool – was a literal remedy for the post First World War symptoms of
supposed German decline that Nazis detested.
I came upon these, among other ideas of Michaud, when preparing the con- ceptual framework
for my recent book, Inhumanities: Nazi Interpretations of Western Culture.3 The gist of these
interpretive points will be familiar to readers of George L. Mosse, whom Michaud should have
cited more vigorously. However, I find that Michaud put some of the key concepts of the History
of Nazi Culture more strongly than I have read elsewhere, and also that they resonate with much
of the material I presented in my latest book, as well as with my previous work about Beethoven
reception in German politics.4 Let me outline a few of Michaud’s more specific points about Nazi
culture.
Again, his primary point was that Nazi cultural politicians strove to increase German selfconfidence by constructing an idealized self-image based on the supposed German place in Western cultural traditions. Or, in his words, »to
make the genius of the race visible to that race [and thereby] restore its faith in itself by making
it conscious of its historic mission.«5 A second major concept Michaud posited was that of the
»Führer as Artist«. Michaud identified Hitler’s public persona as a culmination of the Romantic
exaltation of the artist as spiri- tual leader. In his words:
Hitler presented himself not only as a »man of the people« and a soldier with frontline experience,
but also and above all as a man whose artistic experience constituted the best guarantee of his
ability to mediate the Volk Spirit and turn it in to the »perfect Third Reich«.6
Clearly also, Michaud contended, the construction of the Ideal simultaneously constituted the
construction of the Other, with all that this opposition implied. Again, in his words: »the
appearance of Hitler always entailed, as its corollary, the progressive disappearance of all enemies
who were rejected by the Volk Commu- nity.«7 Returning to the supposedly positive implications
of these cultural-political constructs, Michaud then contended that Nazi insistence that followers
revere past creative leaders was much more about the present and future of the German- becomingNazi nation, than it was about the past. As Michaud wrote, »the task of each work of art« (or
interpretation thereof) was not just to represent, but »to prepare for the realization of the ideal
Reich«.8 Finally, according to Michaud, the culmination of »Nazi culture« was – with catastrophic
consequences – the Second World War itself. Michaud identified the fundamentally military
implications of the Nazi mobilization of culture for party and national purposes with reference to
Goebbels’ statements on the matter: Goebbels conflated »the struggle of the soldier, that of the
worker, and that of ›the creator of culture‹«. Art, the arch-Nazi propagandist pontificated, »is
not a distraction for times of peace; rather, it too is a spiritual and trenchant weapon for war.«9
Having set forth these ideas, Michaud’s book was generally well received, but somewhat criticized
for a lack of grounding in primary source research.10 While I found his examples to be fresh and
well-chosen, I would like to take this opportunity to compare some of his basic points with the
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detailed information my books have revealed about Nazi cultural politics, especially as manifested
in the arts coverage of the main Nazi newspaper, the Völkischer Beobachter. For the purposes
of this article, I will concentrate on examples drawn from the National Socialist invocations of
Ludwig van Beethoven. This focus on Nazi Musikpolitik remains fully legitimate, because music
reception was absolutely central to the History of Kultur as promulgated in the Nazi newspaper.11
Throughout the pages of the Völkischer Beobachter, music was unquestionably deemed »The Most
Ger- man of Arts«. Moreover, Beethoven in particular was revered in Nazi cultural
politics as among the most important of German creators. Again, I do not feel that Michaud
presented these points without sufficient evidence. However, it will be a useful exercise to assess
his points with reference to examples of the Nazi reception of Beethoven as representative of
these concepts in general.
Yet, in doing so, one further fundamental element needs to be explored and underscored. Despite
his important assessments about Nazi cultural propaganda as a whole, Michaud seems to have
missed an all-important point. Almost every one of the thematic components he identifies as
central to Nazi culture had antecedents in nationalistic self-representations that existed prior
to the rise of Hitler and Nazism, and, most evidently, had powerful precedents within German
cultural responses to the First World War.
Hitler himself was very explicit about the significance of wartime models for his methods, particularly in his discussions of »war propaganda« in the pages of Mein Kampf. Some of the most
famous and illuminating passages in Hitler’s so-called autobiography are summaries of the lessons
he learned from the propa- ganda efforts of Germany and its First World War enemies. In his
words, »It was not until the War that it became evident what immense results could be obtained
by a correct application of propaganda.« Specifically, it was from primarily First World War
examples that Hitler claimed to have learned the »art of propaganda«, including the premises
that »all effective propaganda must be limited to a very few points and must harp on these in
slogans« and that »its task is to serve our own right, always and unflinchingly«, among others.12
Therefore, in addition to assessing Michaud’s thematic assessments of Nazi culture as manifested
in examples of Beethoven reception, this article will also compare National Socialist references
with previous German wartime invocations of the composer in order to accentuate the importance of First World War political culture and its impact on subsequent discourses in German
society, including Nazi cultural politics.
Regarding the first of these themes, and indeed Michaud’s pivotal point – that Nazi cultural
politics intended to increase German self-confidence via interpre- tations of the German place
in Western cultural traditions – it is clear that this truly was the message of virtually every
Völkischer Beobachter article devoted to the arts. All of the paper’s cultural-historical commemorations contributed to this effort to bolster faith in the creative Volk community. This was indeed
their main function. And this is powerfully evident in the newspaper’s relentless insistence on,
and never-ending celebration of, the perceived notion that all the great composers of the Western
music tradition were »German« – or alternatively,
»Germanic«, »Aryan«, or »Nordic«.
Perhaps most intensively, the Nazi Party injected race issues into its Beethoven reception.13
Indeed, dictates of racial anthropology nearly nullified the composer’s value as a party hero.
While portraits and observations of Beethoven by his
contemporaries differ tremendously, all reveal that he had few of the physical characteristics
associated with Aryan stereotypes.14 Noticing this, a handful of pseudoscientists concluded that
Beethoven was of impure blood.15 To counter notions that the composer might have been of
mixed racial stock, the main Nazi newspaper vouched for his purity in articles produced to cleanse
Beethoven of supposed physical flaws. The Völkischer Beobachter denounced racial scholars who
had raised questions about Beethoven’s genetic purity: »Dr. Hans Günther errs decidedly« when
he »characterizes Beethoven as predominantly Eastern.«16 Not only by birth, but by virtue of
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his whole essence, Ludwig van Beethoven was a »pureblooded German,« the paper concluded: he
was the »spiritual possession of all Aryan mankind.«17 Ultimately, as Michaud articulated about
Nazi cultural propaganda in general, the Völkischer Beobachter extolled Beethoven’s works as
exemplifying the greatness of Germanic art – and the German race itself. In his music the »soul
of the struggle-tormented, northern German« came to expres- sion.18 According to the paper, its
forceful spirit proved the »world-wide validity of the spiritual work and the soulful nobility that
the greatest sons of the German nation were capable of.« 19
During the First World War, the specific »eugenic« issues of Beethoven’s origins did not arise,
however clear precedents emphasized association of the composer with »Germanness« broadly
defined as a way of bolstering a sense of German identity as the nation went to battle. Activists
such as Houston Stewart Chamberlain were adamant in counting Beethoven among the »true«
poets and thinkers of Germany who openly expressed their Germanness and the desire to see
their nation become powerful,20 and even a liberal newspaper such as the Berliner Tageblatt
favored using Beethoven’s music to inspire wartime patriotism. Published only twenty days after
war was declared, a Berliner Tageblatt essay describing »Wie Beethoven Krieg und Sieg besang«
called for use of Beethoven’s music in motivational pageantry. This article opened by insisting
that Beethoven had been strongly influenced by the nationalistic atmosphere of his time: as the
only classical composer to witness »the glorious emergence of the German Volk«, the Berliner
Tageblatt opined, Beethoven always felt himself as one with it.21
The Zeitung der 10. Armee also integrated reference to Beethoven as an icon of Germanness
into its bellicose rhetoric. »As a »monstrous time broke upon Ger- mans,« as a »terrible world
storm from East and West raged on German lands,« and when »every individual was forced to
fulfill enormous duties«, this military publication considered it proper to contemplate the music
of Beethoven as the
»greatest expression of the time«. By convincing Germans to think of music such as the Third
Symphony – referred to as the Heldensymphonie instead of the Eroica
– as evincing violence, blood, conflict, and fighting, the world war would remove the »last restrictions on a full understanding of Beethoven’s originality: he lives
in our time as the strongest expression of pure Germanness.«22 Letters of at least one soldier
indicate that these views of Beethoven as embodying the German- ness cementing the unified
war effort did take hold during the conflict. Walther Harich, writer and literature scholar who
served at both the western and eastern fronts during the war, used references to the composer
and the German nature they ostensibly shared when conceptualizing the nation for which so
many were sacrificing themselves: When does the notion of the nation »come to life, erupt, and
drive roots into our innermost soul?« It was »always alive«, he answered, in the »titanic force of
Beethoven«.23
Returning to Michaud: in his words, »A declared aim to turn German art into a promise of
German happiness […] became a rallying cry for all the nationalists of both the Second and the
Third Reich.« Hitler could
not fail to win their support when he wrote [in Mein Kampf ]: »How many people are aware of
the infinite number of separate memories of the great- ness of our natural Fatherland in all the
fields of cultural and artistic life?«24
It is clear that Völkischer Beobachter coverage of the Western music tradition, including
Beethoven, insisted that this was indeed the greatest field of German cultural prowess. Moreover,
it is also clear that a similar strategy of employing Beethoven to inspire a sense of common
Germanness had been followed by First World propagandists.
Michaud’s second major theme, the concept of the Führer-Artist, ultimately leads to an even more
immediate association between creators and Nazi leader- ship. As he put it, more completely,
»the fact that the Führer […] was also called the artist of all artists […] placed him immediately
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at the heart of the Western tradition that assigned to art that most decisive of functions.«25 In
the case of music reception in the Völkischer Beobachter, the correlate to Michaud’s assertions
about Hitler as Führer-Artist is the paper’s constant insistence that great creators, including
writers, artists, and composers, were simultaneously political – each, in their own way, ArtistFührer. Indeed, my research shows that Nazi propagandists rigorously promoted the view that
great creators, including Beethoven, were deeply driven by political – especially patriotic and
nationalistic – impulses; at least as much as by artistic drive.
Some selective political biography was necessary in the case of Beethoven on the part of Nazi cultural politicians, for the composer’s inconsistent politics were problematic for the Party. Though
he could, with some reservations, be counted as a member of the German race, Beethoven had
exhibited some enthusiasm about the French Revolution and the rise of Napoleon. Party operatives therefore coun- tered that although Beethoven had been exposed to French revolutionary
ideals,
he was, as Ludwig Schiedermair wrote, always a Rhinelander at heart.26 When it came to defending his nation against French rule, the Völkischer Beobachter held, Beethoven had always
sided with Germany; and though he »temporarily suffered from revolutionary fever,« his »heart
remained with his German Heimat.«27
Moreover, the Nazi paper also rejected any suggestion that Beethoven had been a supporter of
modern democratic ideals, asserting instead that he recognized the need for autocratic leadership
and would have seconded their call for the strong hand of a Führer. The Völkischer Beobachter
stipulated that Beethoven had no absolute hatred of aristocrats, then went on to point out
that the composer had been enthralled with Napoleon’s charisma and domineering tactics: what
made him enthusiastic about Bonaparte was that the Corsican had used strong-armed tactics
to transform the »chaos of the gruesome revolution into state order«. Ultimately, the paper
argued, Beethoven feared »anarchical uprising«, thus rec- ognizing that authoritarian rule »had
its attractions«.28 Thus did Nazi cultural propaganda insist, as Michaud observed in general,
that Beethoven could be perceived as an Artist-Führer himself, or alternatively, as politically
desirous of order imposed by a strong Führer-Artist.
During the First World War, similar notions of Beethoven’s politics had also been posited. Not
unexpectedly, Houston Stewart Chamberlain highlighted the fact that Beethoven had expressed
what could be interpreted as elitist notions of political authority. »It must certainly be noted«,
wrote Chamberlain, »when such a man recognizes that »power is the morality of persons who
distinguish themselves before others.« Beethoven, Chamberlain went on, wanted peace, but he
knew that it could only be enforced by the supremacy of Germany.29 Der Reichsbote tried,
furthermore, to convince contemporary artists to be as nationalistic as Beethoven had supposedly
been. Like him, the conservative journal enjoined, they should participate in the war through
their art: the artistic greats of the present time were far less »nationally disposed« than Beethoven
had been; for instance, they did not consider it a disgrace to play for French, English, or Russian
guests as he did. A little more »Germanic feeling« in the art world, Der Reichsbote insisted,
would not hurt.30
Referring to Beethoven as a »German prince in the realm of tones« who wound a »spiritual band«
around all Germans, the Tägliche Rundschau – outlet of the Pan German League – reprinted a
poem that directly associated Beethoven with German invasion of France:
In this moment, when our Germany Raises itself over all other lands, Should we not honor a man
Who achieved in art that which
Heroes of war and rulers of state Only now carry forth:
He led his Fatherland to victory.31
Finally, further proof that a politicized interpretation of Beethoven, and his Ninth Symphony
in particular, was prominent during the First World War is found in a remarkable source from
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1918. Just fourteen days before hostilities ceased, the Deutsche Militär-Musiker-Zeitung proposed
that Beethoven’s Ninth Symphony be used in advertising to exhort people to contribute to the
ninth »war loan« (Krieg- sanleihe). An article entitled »Soll die ›Neunte‹ für die ›9.‹ werben?«
presented the results of a survey of leading persons in the German music world. This survey
had asked if such a use of Beethoven’s music would be proper. The responses confirm that a
patriotic interpretation of Beethoven was firmly entrenched in wartime German discourse. The
composer Engelbert Humperdinck answered: »Why not? Why not use all nine symphonies, one
after another?« The conductor Siegfried Ochs wrote: »This is more than a question of the Ninth,
or of art«, it is a matter of the »existence or nonexistence of our Fatherland«. The Ninth »can and
must advertise for the ninth war loan.« Hugo Bock, head of the Bote and Bock music publishing
house, contributed the following verse along the same vein:
The »Ninth« with its tones of violence Has often raised our hearts.
The young and old, the weak and powerful, Have always listened, enthralled.
Now we must consider this highest pleasure
Which the most German tone-master created for us In terms of the Fatherland.
Let your thoughts become absorbed With the powerful symphony of battle
Now being waged by Hindenburg and Ludendorff.32
Music-historical material that appeared in Nazi propaganda, as most strongly evinced in the
Völkischer Beobachter, resounded with the Führer-Artist/Artist- Führer theme that Michaud
identified throughout National Socialist cultural politics: at a time »when the world came to be
deserted by the certainty of salva- tion,«33 Nazi Kulturpolitik would »render visible the protector
god who would make it possible for the body of the German race to live eternally.«34 Hitler was
the primary manifestation of this creative leader, but he came, according to this view, at the
head of a long line of notable predecessors – including Beethoven. But here we see that such
associations between Beethoven and strong, even aggressive
and militaristic leadership had already been a common feature of First World War propaganda
within Germany.
This leads to Michaud’s point about the simultaneous construction of the
»opponent« in contrast to the Germanic ideal posited in Nazi culture. In his terms,
»correlatively, Nazism deployed […] violence […] against all those who were likely to place in doubt
that the lost object could be resurrected in the race and in art.« National Socialist terror was
thus employed against »all those who, in reality as well as in Nazi imaginary representations,
opposed its [world view].« 35 Ultimately, according to Michaud, it was this cultural thrust that
led to the policies of both military aggression and, ultimately, racial extermination.
In the case of Beethoven (it is a relief to report) the Nazi propaganda machine, including the
Völkischer Beobachter, was not able to draw upon evidence of anti-Semitic feelings. However, Nazi
cultural propagandists did work to present Beethoven as staunchly and aggressively anti-French,
despite many indications
– at various points in his life – to the contrary. Selective substantiation of these assertions was
offered in various forms. One essay in the Völkischer Beobachter reviewed the story of the Grätz
Castle incident, when Beethoven fled the country home of Prince Lichnowsky after refusing to
perform on the piano for guests, included among which were several French officers. Significantly
titled »Der Patriot«, the Nazi version retold the legend without mentioning the standard explanation of Beethoven’s anger on this occasion – that his artistic pride had been affronted. Instead,
the paper implied that he had acted on nationalistic impulse alone.36 Beethoven »stood firm
at Grätz«, the Völkischer Beobachter declared, because »his patriotic feeling bristled violently
against performing his art for the enemy of his Volk.«37
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Similarly, in articles like »Wörter Beethovens«, National Socialist journalists pulled citations out
of context – including Beethoven’s jest that power was his morality and his angry wish that he
could meet Napoleon on the battlefield – and presented them as evidence that the composer had
been a fierce enemy of the French.38 Carefully selected stories, essays, and quotations suited Nazi
use of Beethoven to fuel bitterness against the enemy to the West. The paper warned that all
Germans had to fight along with the National Socialists to protect Beethoven from the French:
»Woe if his spirit was ever stolen, since that would mean ulti- mate defeat – because his spirit
was German spirit.«39
But, of course, none of this anti-French bile was new to Beethoven reception, or by any means
an innovation of the Nazi Party. For instance, an almost verbatim version of these themes was
produced in wartime Germany by Der Reichsbote, under the telling title »Ein musikalischer
Franzosenfeind«. Published six weeks after the start of the war, this essay also conscripted
Beethoven for the operation in the West. After briefly reviewing the story of Beethoven’s flight
from Grätz
Castle, his refusal to perform before French officers, and his statement that he would have defeated
Napoleon had he known the art of war, the patriotic tract brusquely concluded that the great
works of a Beethoven are »doubly worthy of our attention in these times«, because Beethoven
was »one of the fiercest haters of the French who ever lived«.40
Clearly, Michaud’s point in this case was directed mainly toward the construc- tion of the racial
»other« in cultural terms, as the first step toward eliminationist anti-Semitism. Here we see a
less heinous strain of nationalistic propaganda that posited the creative tradition of Germany –
embodied in Beethoven and his image – as intractably in opposition to the perennial enemy to the
West, during the First World War as well as in the Nazi era. While confirming that Völkischer
Beobachter cultural criticism formulated the image of the »other« – whether racial or national
– through music-historical references, in keeping with Michaud’s assertions, these quotes return
us to what was fundamentally »positive« about National Socialist Kulturpolitik, that is, (again
Michaud) its endeavor to »lead every individual back to the natural reflex of love for his or her
own racial [or national] type and direct them toward a redemptive future.« Above all, Michaud
postulated that National Socialist invocations of past creative leaders were intended as symbolic
indications of what the New Germany would become, not just validations of present Nazi policies
and ideas with references to the past. In his words, »the awakening into the myth« was generally
conceived as a »reca- pitulation of the past directed toward the future.« To support this, Michaud
cited Baldur von Schirach’s declaration that
The perfect artists Michelangelo and Rembrandt, and Beethoven and Goe- the, do not represent
an appeal to return to the past, but show us the future that is ours and to which we belong.41
As Michaud implies, von Schirach’s line says it very succinctly: the Völkischer Beobachter cultural
section was clearly designed for the same reasons, and throughout its music coverage we can find
examples of direct associations of composers and their works with the Nazi party and its plans
for the future – including and especially Beethoven.
While cultural and political conflicts raged in Weimar Germany, the editor- in-chief of the Nazi
paper published a front-page editorial marking the one- hundredth anniversary of Ludwig van
Beethoven’s death on March 26, 1927. In it, Alfred Rosenberg declared that during the present
epoch of »spiritual battle«, followers of Adolf Hitler could consider Beethoven’s music a powerful source of inspiration. Whoever understood the spirit of the National Socialist move- ment,
Rosenberg claimed, knew that impulses which Beethoven embodied »in
the highest degree« lived in all its members – namely, the desire to »storm over the ruins of
a crumbling world«, »the will to »reshape the world«, and the sense of joy that comes from
»overcoming passionate sorrow«. When Nazis achieved victory in Germany and across Europe,
Rosenberg asserted, they would enjoy
»heart-warming consciousness« that »the German Beethoven towered over all the peoples of the
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West«. They would then remember that Beethoven had passed on to National Socialists the »will
of German creation«. Living in the Eroica of the German Volk, Rosenberg wrote, Nazis wanted
to make use of this willpower.42
Rosenberg went on to remind all Germans that no memorial day could release more profound
powers in German life as could one honoring the death of this composer. Among the great manifestations of the »Germanic West«, the self- styled Nazi philosopher went on, two human types
stood out. The first, embodied by Leonardo, Descartes, Kant, Leibniz, and Goethe, approached
the secrets of life by »surrounding them like a fortress and trying to conquer it from all sides
with a universal strategy«. The other »Germanic-Western type« – personified by Michelangelo,
Rembrandt, Schopenhauer, and Wagner – preferred to pursue the secrets of existence with »double the energy, but from only one side: they wanted to destroy the fortress and reveal its inner
contents by frontal assault.«
Beethoven belonged to the second type, said Rosenberg, since he »grabbed fate by the throat«.
Consequently his »Dämonie« was more relevant in eras of
»mythical-political struggle« like the present than in times of »contemplative- peaceful existence«.
In the Weimar epoch, old values were disintegrating and new ones were being born, and this
required a »one-sided, impulsive strategy« like the composer’s. Naturally, he added, participants
in the National Socialist movement would derive the most from this store of strength.43 Thus did
the Völkischer Beobachter and its then heralded editor-in-chief assert, just as Michaud observed
about Nazi cultural politics in general, that Beethovenian spirit was not just a factor of German
history, but a force of the past full of indications about the possibilities of the future.44
Yet again, this forward-looking impulse of Nazi propaganda had clear analogies in the culture of
the Great War. Naturally, the »future« toward which most First World War propaganda was
oriented was somewhat more restricted to the hoped for end of the war, in victory for Germany.
But, consistently throughout wartime references to Beethoven and his music, ran implications
that they symbolized the certainty of a positive outcome for the nation. For instance, the Berliner
Tageblatt implied that it was only because of his deafness that Beethoven did not himself take
up a weapon and participate in battle against Napoleon. Neverthe- less, knowing that soldiers in
the field required music as much as they needed nourishment and sleep, Beethoven »gave brave
fighters the best he had to give: his art«. The military marches Beethoven composed for this
patriotic purpose, not
being his finest technical work, were usually neglected by scholars and perform- ers. As enemies
threatened Germany, however, the Berliner Tageblatt believed that Beethoven’s martial songs
had to be awakened from their »deep slumber«. It proposed mass distribution of Beethoven
scores to mustering soldiers, perhaps from the air. Hundreds of thousands of copies of songs
by Beethoven, the paper strategized, should be distributed to the German and Austrian armies.
From beyond the grave, Beethoven would then be »with his courageous compatriots«.45 Working
to revive them, the paper described a number of pieces Beethoven had composed in response to
the Napoleonic invasion and the Wars of Liberation, including Wellingtons Sieg, the Chor auf die
verbündeten Fürsten, and Der glorreiche Augenblick. Most prominent among these war tunes, in
this opinion, were the Third and Seventh symphonies: in the »Funeral March« of the former once
could sense Horace’s fateful notion, dulce et decorum est pro patria mori; the Seventh, it argued,
was prophetically written to commemorate the victory of the forces ranged against France (which
did not occur until three years after the first performance of the symphony). In addition, the
Berliner Tageblatt put much effort into reinvigo- rating another song of victory that Beethoven
had, in the composer’s words, »laid on the altar of his love for the Fatherland«. Referring to the
1813 defeat of France at Leipzig, Beethoven’s incidental music for the Singspiel Die Ehrenpforten,
WoO 97, included the triumphant line: »Es ist vollbracht, es ist vollbracht!« The paper
»hoped and prayed« that Germans would not have to wait until 1915 to be able to sing this
again, that they could hold a »secular celebration« of victory before the end of 1914.46 This
wish – expressed within the Berliner Tageblatt’s analysis of Beethoven’s music – exemplifies the
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optimistic attitudes that prevailed in the generation of 1914 that went to war expecting to get
home by Christmas.
Much later in the conflict that certainly did not end so quickly, on Beethoven’s one hundred
thirty-seventh birthday in 1917, the Tägliche Rundschau pressed for celebrations to mark the
occasion even during the present battle. In time of war, the paper argued, it was natural to
»lovingly and appreciatively honor« Beethoven, since his compositions were so »warlike«. They
had helped to defeat France in 1814 and 1870, the paper recalled, as well as bring about the
process of German unification; perhaps they would have the same magic effect on the present
struggle.
While highlighting the Nazi obsession with the artistic past perceived in »Ger- manic« terms,
Michaud made it clear that this was not a retrogressive »move« in Nazi culture, but a forward
looking call for future developments. Again opening with a citation from von Schirach, Michaud
put it thus:
As Baldur von Schirach said, »In Germany, there is nothing more alive than our dead.« The
immense effort of realization that was sweeping a whole
people toward its ideal Third Reich was certainly quite the reverse of the work of mourning. It
was the work of [reminiscence] that asserted itself as faith in one’s own power to reawaken the
lost object47
– that is, to »produce the New Man.«48
While First World War era Beethoven reception targeted more immediate strategic goals, namely
victory for German arms, it clearly conveyed this forward- looking dynamic that would ultimately drive the nation into subsequent battles. Ultimately, indeed, the momentum of Nazism
relentlessly led to a second world- wide war, and Michaud helps us to remember that the stated
justifications for this policy was realization of an idealized vision of Germany as Kulturnation
formu- lated, in part, by the Nazi cultural politics – including its Beethoven reception. As
Michaud phrased it, for National Socialism warfare
had the same function as all its other »battles«. Like the »battle for art«,
»the battle on the birth front«, and the »battle for production«, it was part and parcel of »the
battle for life« that was to lead to the realization of the essence of the German people.
For, »over and above all its tumults, the war was primarily intended to restore the calm and
radiant vision of the eternal Reich that lay as a dream in the heart of the Volk spirit.«49
There is no doubt that Nazi propagandists enlisted the whole of the Western cultural tradition,
as perceived in National Socialist terms, to serve in their bellig- erent cause. Just when German
armies were invading Poland, Goebbels addressed the Reich Cultural Chamber with a speech
that made the cultural dimension of the conflict clear. Nazis, he proclaimed, never reserved art
for peacetime alone: »for us, the notion that when the call to arms sounds, the muses go silent,
has no valid- ity«. To the contrary, »we have always held the position that it is precisely in such
a moment« that the muses »need to deploy their powers«. Under Hitler’s leadership, the Nazis
had placed this »spiritual weapon into the hand of our Volk« to wield as the German nation was
»mustering to battle for its very existence«.50
Along with other »titans« of the Nazi-formulated tradition, Beethoven appeared throughout
World War Two propaganda as a »fighter of great willpower.«51 In these decisive days, said
the Allgemeine Musik-Zeitung, Beethoven, the »hard-tested her- ald of fate,« communicated his
»amor fati to fighting men who are brave enough to look death and ruin in the eye«.52 To keep
morale high, music scholars such as Erich Schenk, Walther Vetter, and Ludwig Schiedermair
produced wartime articles and lectures exhorting people to consider Beethoven a motivational
figure in battle. According to Schenk, in the life of no other composer did the experiences of war
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play as significant a role as they did in Beethoven’s.53 Vetter felt that the politics and warmaking of his time belonged among the influences that Beethoven »forged with the heat of his
genius into motivating forces.«54 Schiedermair, long-time head of the Beethovenhaus in Bonn,
concluded that the »heroic Wehrmacht« could interpret Beethoven’s »tragic« symphonies as
»example, encouragement, admonition, and assurance of victory« over the »dark demons that
are circling German life.«55
In line with these »academic« recommendations, many wartime Beethoven performances were
arranged.56 But perhaps the most explicit version of this policy occurred on 19 April 1942, just
after Hitler personally assumed direct command of forces in the East. To mark the occasion, along
with Hitler’s birthday, Goeb- bels arranged a special celebration. Its culmination was a nationally broadcast performance of the Ninth Symphony, and in his accompanying speech Goebbels
dictated what he expected listeners to draw from the event. As part of its own contribution to
the effort, the Völkischer Beobachter reprinted his statement in full.
If ever the German nation felt itself united in one thought and one will, then it is in the thought
of serving and obeying [Hitler]. The sounds of the most heroic music of titans that ever flowed
from a Faustian German heart should raise this realization to a serious and devotional height.
When, at the end of our celebration, the voices and instruments strike the tremendous closing
chord of the Ninth Symphony, when the exhilarating chorale sounds joy and carries a feeling
for the greatness of these times into each and every German cabin, when [Beethoven’s] hymn
resounds over all distant countries where German regiments stand guard, then we want everyone,
whether man, woman, child, soldier, farmer, worker, or civil servant, to be equally aware of the
seriousness of the hour and to experience the tremendous happiness of being able to witness and
take part in this, the greatest historical epoch of our Volk.57
Besides this nation-wide use of new technologies to bind the Volk with Beetho- venian spirit
in the interest of the war effort, another common Nazi wartime pro- paganda technique was to
publish letters by soldiers explaining the reasons why they were fighting. Under the title »Wir
verteidigen Beethoven: Ein Feldpostbrief gibt Rechenschaft über den Sinn des Krieges«, Die
Musik Woche reprinted the letter of a soldier who described defending the western coast against
an air attack just after hearing a broadcast of Beethoven’s Violin Concerto. At that moment, he
had understood the »meaning of the war«.
You ask me what all this has to do with the music I just heard. Let me say to you that a
statement of the Führer struck me at that moment. He said that
a single great German, Beethoven, had achieved more for human culture than all the British
plutocrats put together. This pompous clique sends its machines over here supposedly in order
to save culture and civilization. In truth, however, they attack in desperate fury against the
victorious storm of a new, better world that is shaking their decayed world apart. Weren’t
you, as I, seized by a fanatical eagerness to fight when agitated by the sounds of the Violin
Concerto? At the time I thought of innumerable testimonials to our German culture; I thought
of the thousands of events in which this culture has been brought to life in the consciousness
of the Volksgemeinschaft; and I saw the simple comrades of the Volk thankfully surrendering
themselves to this music which German [National] Socialism made accessible to them. With the
notion of this better and more beautiful world, [though,] I also linked thoughts of that spirit
which rejects it and believes it can destroy [it] with blockades and bombs. We, however, are
opposing this attempt with our grenades night after night. Do not laugh if it seemed to me in
these minutes as if we had to defend Beethoven, who, himself unhappy, gave us the »Hymn to
Joy« and taught us what it meant to fight.58
Nazi use of this letter, and others like it, certify that the process of politicizing Beethoven both
before and during the war was designed signify that the conflict was ostensibly aimed not at
military and territorial victory alone, but cultural achievement in the same drive of creativity
symbolized by the composer and his works.59 But once again, by the time of Hitler’s second war,
there was nothing new in any of this.
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Soon after the Great War had broken out, Hermann Hesse entitled an essay with the first words
of the Ninth Symphony: »O Freunde, nicht diese Töne!« Beneath this admonishment, he berated
fellow artists and men of letters for contributing to the military effort. He contended that his
creative colleagues – who should have remained outside the political struggle – were doing as
much as politicians to heighten hostilities – inflaming German hatred for other European nations
and »carrying the war into the realm of the spirit«.60 Despite his repri- mand, martial tones
thundered in the cultural atmosphere of wartime Europe. Above all, contemporaries observed
and statistics indicate, Beethoven’s music became dominant – some thought excessively so –
in German concert programs once fighting began.61 By the winter of 1915, one critic believed,
Beethoven’s works could be heard as often as three times a day in Berlin. In fact, this nationwide
tendency provoked a debate on whether »too much Beethoven« was performed during the war. 62
But complaints were neither numerous nor heeded. It was undoubtedly a widely held belief that
Beethoven’s »heroic music« was highly if not most fitting during wartime. Given this popular
attitude, the policy of
inspiring Germans to fight by programming Beethoven’s compositions was an obvious measure
for cultural authorities to take. As a result, between 1914 and 1918 Beethoven’s works became
increasingly associated with military values, nationalist goals, and wartime experiences.
While Beethoven served as a symbol of German superiority for those attend- ing concerts at home
during the war, his music was also perceived as a cultural weapon at the front. In May of 1915,
the Berlin Philharmonic presented two all-Beethoven concerts in the Théâtre de la Monnaie of
occupied Brussels. As reported in Signale, these performances of the song An die ferne Geliebte,
op. 98, the Fifth Piano Concerto, and the Fifth Symphony were not intended to improve relations
with the Belgians: despite reference in this report to the »conciliatory power of music«, the goal
of these performances was to extend occupation of Belgium into the spiritual realm. According to
the story, entitled »Kunst Stra- tegie«, German military authorities »expected much of them« as
valuable tools in the »moral conquest of Belgium«.63 Here too, the »moral« or spiritual impetus
behind the war effort was supposedly manifested, even driven, by the music of the nation –
particularly Beethoven’s.
Of course, few soldiers on either side of the line were capable of associating Beethoven’s music with
the experience of battle in this way; even fewer had the wherewithal to analyze his piano sonatas
during stand-downs, as musicologist Hugo Riemann did with fellow officers.64 It is apparent,
though, that many front soldiers reared in the musical culture of the German middle class did
think of Beethoven and his compositions when articulating their feelings about modern war,
and that propaganda authorities – newspaper editors in particular – wanted people at home
to believe that soldiers were fighting for such high-cultural ide- als.65 A student from Leipzig
anonymously described the significance Beethoven’s Fifth Symphony held for him as he served in
the artillery near Soissons, and his letter home was popularized during the war in the Vossische
Zeitung and the Deutsche Militär-Musiker-Zeitung under the title »Beethovens C-moll-Sinfonie
im Schützengraben.« The following passage warrants full reproduction, in com- parison with
those cited above:
Recently during the night I have gone through the C-Minor in my mind: that is truly the
symphony of war. The introductory measures in fortissimo are the mobilization orders. Then
the measures in piano: anxiousness before the tremendous [events ahead]. Then the crescendo
and again fortissimo: the overcoming of all terror and fear and the summoning of courage and
unity, rising to a unified will to victory. The second theme represents our loved ones at home,
their worries, their pain, and their loving favors. In the bass of this section, the first theme [is
recalled]: the faraway thunder of
the battle on the border; the rise to fortissimo: the rejoicing of victory in the Fatherland. The
second part of the first movement is the war itself, the great battles. The measures with the
half-notes [describe] the long waiting in fortified positions, intermittently broken by the short
first theme: the violent battles for the fortified positions, like those we go through here. Second
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movement: the work of love in the homeland and the sadness of those left behind. Third movement: the battle, the privations, the perseverance; the trio: the gayer side of life in the field.
The transition from the third to the fourth movement: the final, decisive battle. The fourth
movement: victory, rejoicing, and peace!66
These words, penned and then broadly publicized almost thirty years earlier, hauntingly anticipate the cultural justifications for a war that Hitler, Goebbels, and their operatives held, as
Michaud put it, to be »over and above its tumults« – promising, as a reward for »perseverance«,
a new realm of Beethovenian spiri- tuality and even peace.
Knowing of the utter devastation it wreaked, we reject the National Socialist promotion of the
war as leading to a future of German cultural advancement.67 Still, we must recognize that Nazi
propaganda did not present the war as an end in itself, but as a means toward re-establishing
Germany as Kulturnation. In this endeavor they failed, after twelve years of terror and six years of
carnage. But Michaud’s arguments, combined with evidence compiled largely from the Völkischer
Beobachter cultural section, in particular its treatment of the Western music tradition, help us to
understand better what impelled these destructive forces. The ironic realization is that, however
distorted, they were originally conceived in »creative« terms – strongly, though not exclusively,
modeled on those idealized in the person and music of Ludwig van Beethoven. But, it is also
important to keep in mind that, for all its unprecedented destruction, the terms by which the
Second Word War was »constructed« for the German imagination were in great part based on
precedents that had been formulated during the First World War. By comparing, via the single
case study of Beethoven invocations as representative of countless others, justifications that he
and his followers fabri- cated for their own vision of a German »future,« we can better see that
Hitler’s career, »culture,« and war were all rooted in – and ultimately extensions of – that first
conflagration.
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